Accountable care organizations (ACOs) are groups of health care providers that have agreed to be held accountable for the cost and quality of care for a group of beneficiaries. ACOs may qualify for shared savings payments if the spending for their assigned patients is lower than expected and may be required to make payments to CMS if the spending is higher than expected. The goals for ACOs are to improve coordination and quality of care, maintain beneficiary choice of provider, and reduce unnecessary service use. Beneficiaries do not enroll in ACOs; instead, Medicare assigns beneficiaries to ACOs based on their Medicare claims history. The beneficiary is still free to use providers outside of the ACO. If assigned beneficiaries choose to go to a provider outside of the ACO, the ACO remains responsible for that spending. This creates an incentive for the ACO providers to satisfy their patients and keep them in the ACO. Medicare provides ACOs with claims data for assigned beneficiaries to help the ACOs coordinate care. This design avoids some of the overhead costs associated with Medicare Advantage (MA) plans, such as marketing, enrollment, creating networks, and paying claims.

There are currently two major Medicare ACO programs. The Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) is a permanent part of the Medicare program. It was created by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA) and became operational in 2012. The program has 518 ACOs serving 10.9 million beneficiaries.

The second ACO program is the Next Generation ACO demonstration (NextGen), which started in 2016 and now has 41 ACOs participating. It incorporates higher levels of risk and reward than the MSSP. Spending targets are set differently so that they are more predictable and incorporate a discount to reflect relative efficiency. The demonstration ends in 2020.

What are ACOs accountable for?

Medicare ACOs are accountable for the total Medicare Part A and Part B spending for a defined population of beneficiaries and for the quality of their care.

Who can form an ACO?

ACOs are groups of providers such as physicians and hospitals. The group must include primary care providers because beneficiaries are assigned to ACOs based on their use of primary care services. Other providers such as specialists and hospitals can be included but are not required. Unlike MA plans, ACOs do not need to have a network that provides all Medicare services. This is because Medicare beneficiaries who are assigned to ACOs can, like any other fee-for-service (FFS) beneficiary, go to any provider who accepts Medicare. Beneficiaries are not “locked in” to the ACO.

Payment mechanics

Providers in ACOs generally continue to be paid their normal FFS rates by Medicare. In addition to these payments, ACO providers have the opportunity to earn bonus payments if, at the end of the year, actual total spending for the ACO’s assigned beneficiaries is less than target spending. An ACO that has chosen to enter a two-sided risk arrangement is also at risk of losses if actual total spending for its assigned beneficiaries is greater than the spending target.

Prior to the start of every performance year, an ACO specifies its participating providers. Medicare then determines which beneficiaries received the plurality of their primary care from those ACO providers in the year prior. Those beneficiaries are then assigned to the ACO if the model uses prospective assignment or provisionally assigned if the model uses retrospective assignment. In the latter
case, final assignment is made at the end of the performance year.

To determine the target spending for an ACO’s assigned beneficiaries during the performance year (the “benchmark”), CMS computes the total Part A and Part B spending for beneficiaries who would have been assigned to the ACO during a baseline period. In the MSSP program, the baseline period is the three years prior to the start of an ACO’s contract. Spending is averaged over the three-year baseline period, with more recent expenditures given more weight. That historical spending for the ACO’s beneficiaries is then blended with the average regional spending for FFS beneficiaries in the ACO’s market who would have been eligible for assignment to an ACO. To account for inflation, the baseline spending is trended forward using trends in FFS spending.

At the end of the year, actual expenditures for the ACO’s assigned beneficiaries are compared with the spending benchmark, and savings or losses are computed. If there are savings (that is, actual expenditures are less than the benchmark), those savings are shared between the Medicare program and the ACO at a defined shared savings rate. For example, in the MSSP, ACOs can receive bonus payments of up to 75 percent of savings. If there are losses (that is, actual expenditures are greater than the benchmark), those losses may be shared between the program and the ACO, if the ACO has chosen a two-sided risk arrangement. (Losses are not shared under a one-sided risk arrangement.) Quality also enters into the calculation of shared savings and losses. Essentially, the higher the quality, the greater the share of the savings the ACO receives (and the smaller the share of the losses in a two-sided risk arrangement). In the MSSP, this process is repeated each year of the contract, and then the ACO baseline is rebased to start another contract period.

Prior to July 2019, the MSSP had four separate tracks—Track 1, Track 1+, Track 2, and Track 3—with varying risk arrangements and other parameters. Track 1 contained bonuses only (one-sided risk). Track 1+ incorporated limited downside risk (two-sided risk) with additional flexibilities to coordinate

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**Table 1  MSSP ACO parameters by track and level**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BASIC track</th>
<th>A&amp;B level</th>
<th>C level</th>
<th>D level</th>
<th>E level</th>
<th>ENHANCED track</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maximum shared savings:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limit</td>
<td>10% of benchmark</td>
<td>10% of benchmark</td>
<td>10% of benchmark</td>
<td>10% of benchmark</td>
<td>20% of benchmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum shared loss:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>No shared losses</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>40–75%c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limit</td>
<td>No shared losses</td>
<td>2% of revenuea</td>
<td>4% of revenuea</td>
<td>8% of revenuea</td>
<td>15% of benchmark</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note:  MSSP (Medicare Shared Savings Program), ACO (accountable care organization).

a The maximum shared loss is the lower of the designated percent of the ACO’s Medicare fee-for-service revenue or the designated percent of the benchmark.
b Shared loss level in Level E will coincide with requirements for advanced alternative payment models.
c The rate is set to 1 minus final shared savings rate. The value can vary in the range shown.

care. Tracks 2 and 3 incorporated greater bonuses and greater downside risk. ACOs that began a contract under one of these tracks prior to July 2019 have the option of completing the remainder of the contract (up to three years).

Starting in July 2019, the MSSP has two tracks, BASIC and ENHANCED (Table 1). Within the BASIC track there are 5 levels (A through E) with increasing levels of risk. Generally, ACOs in the BASIC track must move up one level each year until they reach the highest level of risk (Level E). All models in both the BASIC and ENHANCED tracks allow ACOs to choose between prospective and retrospective assignment each year and all require a minimum of 5,000 assigned beneficiaries. As of July 2019, 366 MSSP ACOs are in a one-sided risk arrangement and 152 are in a two-sided risk arrangement (Table 2).

**Risk adjustment**—To determine the performance of an ACO in MSSP or NextGen, CMS takes into account the reported change in health status of an ACO’s population. The reported change could be due to changes in beneficiaries’ health status or changes in coding patterns. For example, the MSSP uses the hierarchical condition category (HCC) risk scores of the assigned beneficiaries to assess their risk. Risk scores for an ACO’s population are adjusted to be comparable with the change in risk scores for all FFS beneficiaries eligible for assignment. After adjustment, the MSSP limits the increase of an ACO’s average risk score to 3 percentage points between the final baseline year and the performance year.

**Quality**—CMS measures ACOs’ quality in four domains:

- **Patient/caregiver experience:** 10 measures
- **Care coordination/patient safety:** 4 measures
- **Preventive health:** 6 measures
- **Clinical care for at-risk population:** 3 measures

The total number of points earned in a domain is divided by the maximum possible number of points, generating a domain score. Each domain score is weighted at 25 percent of the total quality score. The total quality score is multiplied by the shared savings rate to find the final shared savings rate. That rate is used to determine the amount of shared savings the ACO receives if the ACO achieves shared savings. In two-sided risk models, the final shared loss rate is one minus the final shared savings rate (with some limits), which means the higher the quality score, the lower the shared loss rate.
Quality benchmarks are computed using Medicare claims data, data from the Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS), quality data reported by ACOs, and quality data collected from the larger Medicare FFS population. ACOs can score additional points for significant quality improvement (in contrast to attaining specified levels of performance), up to four points in each domain. However, the total points earned cannot exceed the maximum number of points possible in the domain.

Results to date

CMS reports that the MSSP has shown modest success in improving quality, with MSSP ACOs showing improvement in performance on quality measures over time and achieving better results than FFS on many of the quality measures for which comparable results were available. CMS also reports that some ACOs have achieved modest reductions in spending relative to their benchmarks. The reductions to date have been disproportionately from ACOs in areas with high service use.

It is important to note that assessments of the success of Medicare’s ACO programs depend on the metric used for comparison. ACO benchmarks are designed to reflect policy goals and create incentives for individual ACOs. Benchmarks are not necessarily the best measure of the ACO program’s overall success at reducing service use and spending. When assessing the success of a Medicare ACO program as a whole, a counterfactual (i.e., what spending would have been in the absence of an ACO program) measure should be used. We have estimated that the change in spending from 2012 to 2016 for beneficiaries assigned to MSSP ACOs in 2013 was 1 to 2 percentage points lower than a comparison group of beneficiaries.\(^4\) This estimate does not account for shared savings payments made to the MSSP ACOs over that period.

As for the NextGen demonstration, a recent study found a 1.7 percent reduction in Medicare spending in 2016 for assigned beneficiaries relative to a counterfactual, not taking into account shared savings payments to the ACOs. After accounting for shared savings, the study found a 1.1 percent reduction in spending for aligned beneficiaries.\(^5\)

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1 CMS allows beneficiaries to identify a “main doctor;” if they do so, the agency assigns those beneficiaries to ACOs on that basis. However, to date, few beneficiaries have identified a main doctor.

2 Plurality of primary care is defined as an ACO’s practitioners providing the plurality of certain qualified evaluation and management services measured by charges for those services.

3 Until July 1, 2019, contracts in the MSSP were three years long; they are now five years long.


5 NORC at the University of Chicago. 2018. First annual report: Next Generation Accountable Care Organization (NGACO) Model evaluation. Report prepared by staff from NORC at the University of Chicago for the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation. Bethesda, MD: NORC.