

# **Structural differences between the Part D PDP and MA-PD markets**

Shinobu Suzuki, Tara Hayes, Andy Johnson

April 10, 2025

# Presentation roadmap

- 1 Background on the Part D program
- 2 Concerning trends in Part D and policies that may contribute to those trends
- 3 Factors that may affect costs and payments for PDPs and MA-PDs
- 4 Part D redesign and trends in the PDP market
- 5 Discussion

# Background on the Part D program

---

- The Part D program relies on competition among private plans
- Plans vary by premium, cost sharing, formulary, and pharmacy network
- Two markets with distinct structures:
  - Stand-alone PDPs for FFS beneficiaries
  - MA-PDs, combining medical and drug coverage, for MA enrollees
- Part D market is highly concentrated, with most large firms offering plans in both markets. In 2024, the 5 largest firms\* accounted for:
  - 75% of all Part D enrollees nationally
  - Over 80% of the state's total Part D enrollment in many states

**Note:** PDP (prescription drug plan), FFS (fee-for-service), MA-PD (Medicare Advantage prescription drug [plan]).  
\* The 5 largest organizations varied across states, but large national insurers were also dominant at the state level.

## Background on the Part D program (cont.)


---

- Consistent with the shift from FFS to MA in the broader Medicare program, Part D's enrollment has also shifted from PDPs to MA-PDs
- While Part D is just one piece of the complex choice faced by Medicare beneficiaries, the lack of (relatively attractive) PDP options could be consequential in driving beneficiaries' choice between MA and FFS

**Note:** FFS (fee-for-service), MA (Medicare Advantage), PDP (prescription drug plan), MA-PD (Medicare Advantage Prescription Drug [plan]).

# Concerning trends for the PDP market

## #1. Average basic premiums for PDPs have exceeded those of MA-PDs



**Note:** PDP (prescription drug plan), MA-PD (Medicare Advantage Prescription Drug [plan]), LIS (low-income subsidy). Premiums weighted by enrollment in the month of July.


**Source:** Part D premium and enrollment files from CMS.

## #2. Number of PDPs offered has declined in recent years

- Affects the availability of “benchmark” plans:
  - Premium free for LIS enrollees
  - Default plans for LIS enrollees who otherwise would not have enrolled in a Part D plan
- In 2025, on average, 4 PDPs qualified as benchmark plans per PDP region, down from 10 in 2014

# Concerning trends for the PDP market (cont.)

#3. PDPs, on average, had higher gross costs but lower average risk scores than MA-PDs



#4. PDPs were more likely to incur losses compared with MA-PDs\*

- Related to diverging trends in gross costs and risk scores?
  - Risk scores directly affect payments to plans
  - Payment accuracy requires alignment of costs and payments, in the aggregate

**Note:** PDP (prescription drug plan), MA-PD (Medicare Advantage Prescription Drug [plan]), LIS (low-income subsidy).

\* Calculation of profits/losses in risk corridors excludes profit margins included in plan bids.

**Source:** Part D risk-score file, prescription drug event data, and enrollment files from CMS.



# Why does the stability of the PDP market matter?

---

- Stability of the PDP market is important for FFS beneficiaries
- Currently, enrolling in a stand-alone PDP is the only way FFS beneficiaries can obtain Part D drug coverage
- Premium-free PDPs, or benchmark plans, serve an important role in ensuring that FFS beneficiaries who receive the LIS have drug coverage at no cost\*

**Note:** PDP (prescription drug plan), FFS (fee-for-service), LIS (low-income subsidy), MA (Medicare Advantage).  
\* Some LIS beneficiaries pay nominal copays (set in law) when they fill their prescriptions.

# MA and Part D policies: MA-PDs have an additional funding source (MA rebates) to enhance Part D offerings

---

- MA rebates allow MA-PDs to:
  - Charge low, or \$0, premiums without lowering their bids
  - Subsidize the costs of supplemental Part D benefits
- PDPs do not have any additional funding source; their bids and the full expected costs of any supplemental benefits determine enrollee premiums
- Rebate-financed benefits provide financial protection and more generous coverage for MA-PD enrollees but could also affect competition in the Part D market

**Note:** MA-PD (Medicare Advantage Prescription Drug [plan]), MA (Medicare Advantage), PDP (prescription drug plan).



# MA and Part D policies: MA-PDs have an additional opportunity to adjust their Part D premiums

---

- MA-PDs may reallocate the MA rebate amount in their bids after the national average bid and LIS benchmark amounts are announced:
  - Allows MA-PDs to achieve their target basic Part D premium or LIS benchmark amount
  - Ensures that MA-PD enrollees receive the full value of MA rebates
  - May help stabilize premiums across years, ensure premium-free status for LIS, and maximize LIS premium revenue
- PDPs do not have this additional opportunity (or funds)
  - PDPs that miss the LIS benchmark may lose their LIS enrollees or receive lower premium revenue\*

**Note:**

MA-PD (Medicare Advantage Prescription Drug [plan]), MA (Medicare Advantage), LIS (low-income subsidy), PDP (prescription drug plan).

\* PDPs that bid too high relative to the LIS benchmark but within the de minimis amount (\$2) must waive the "excess" premiums to maintain premium-free status for LIS enrollees. PDPs that bid below the LIS benchmark will not be maximizing their premium revenue.

# MA and Part D policies: MA-PDs can offer D-SNPs that limit enrollment to beneficiaries who receive the LIS

---

- Ability to offer separate plans for LIS enrollees may offer advantages because:
  - LIS enrollees face little or no cost sharing and typically pay no premiums, so they face different financial incentives than non-LIS enrollees
  - Differences in incentives may affect how plans design their formularies and benefits for LIS beneficiaries (e.g., D-SNPs use defined standard benefit)
- PDPs cannot perfectly limit enrollment by LIS status
  - May face greater challenges in balancing the need to offer an attractive benefit (e.g., with copays) while managing spending to keep premiums low

**Note:** MA (Medicare Advantage), MA-PD (Medicare Advantage Prescription Drug [plan]), D-SNP (dual-eligible special-needs plan), LIS (low-income subsidy), PDP (prescription drug plan).

# Assessing the relationship between costs and payments for PDPs and MA-PDs


---

- We use risk-standardized costs to compare the alignment of costs to payments between MA-PDs and PDPs
  - Risk-standardized costs reflect actual beneficiary costs standardized for a beneficiary with average expected costs
  - For a given beneficiary, a higher risk score will result in lower risk-standardized costs
- On average, MA-PDs have lower costs relative to what is predicted by their risk score while PDPs have higher costs relative to what is predicted by their risk score

**Note:** MA-PD (Medicare Advantage Prescription Drug [plan]), PDP (prescription drug plan). Risk scores adjust payments to Part D plans.

# Average risk-standardized costs for MA-PDs are substantially below those of PDPs

Percentage difference from the overall Part D average



**Note:** MA-PD (Medicare Advantage–Prescription Drug [plan]), PDP (prescription drug plan). “MA-PD” includes both conventional MA-PDs and special-needs plans. “Costs” reflect a plan’s gross benefit liability before accounting for postsale rebates and discounts. In 2023, there was a noticeable drop in the magnitude of the difference in the average risk-standardized costs between MA-PDs and PDPs, which may, in part, be due to the uptick in spending for an antidiabetic drug which tended to be more generously covered by MA-PDs.

**Source:** Part D prescription drug event data, Part D risk score file, and Medicare enrollment file from CMS.

# Factors driving differences in risk-standardized costs for PDPs and MA-PDs

---

- Differences in how plans manage benefit spending
  - Cost-sharing tiers to encourage the use of lower-cost drugs
  - Utilization management tools
- Differences in diagnostic-coding behavior
  - Differences in MA and FFS may translate to coding-intensity differences for MA-PDs and PDPs
- Other factors that affect the relationship between spending on medications and payments to plans

**Note:** MA-PD (Medicare Advantage Prescription Drug [plan]), PDP (prescription drug plan).


# Could formularies explain some of the difference in costs between MA-PDs and PDPs?

---

- Plans may use formularies to manage spending and encourage use of lower-cost products through:
  - Product coverage
  - Tier placement
  - Utilization management
- Compared formularies for MA-PDs\* and PDPs in 2024 and 2025 to assess plan generosity and benefit management, including:
  - All Part D-eligible products
  - Subset of products with the highest spending (high cost and highly utilized)
  - The 50 most frequently filled generics
  - Select brands with generic availability

**Note:** MA-PD (Medicare Advantage Prescription Drug [plan]), PDP (prescription drug plan). \* Analysis included conventional MA-PDs only (excludes special-needs plans).

# Differences in MA-PD and PDP formularies indicate more generous coverage among MA-PDs



- MA-PDs cover more products and place more products on lower cost-sharing tiers
- Both plan types cover a smaller share of products in 2025 than in 2024, but coverage for MA-PD enrollees continued to be more favorable


**Note:** MA-PD (Medicare Advantage Prescription Drug [plan]), PDP (prescription drug plan).

**Source:** Acumen LLC analysis of Part D formulary files for 2024 and 2025 and 2024 enrollment data for MedPAC.



# MA-PDs were slightly less likely than PDPs to use utilization management tools

Share of covered products with UM applied



- Both MA-PDs and PDPs apply UM to roughly half of covered products in 2025
- Quantity limits (QLs) are the most common type of UM used for both plan types; QLs increased in 2025 more than other types of UM

**Note:** MA-PD (Medicare Advantage Prescription Drug [plan]), PDP (prescription drug plan), UM (utilization management). Shares of products "on formulary" in this chart represent the share of all products at the active-ingredient level eligible for coverage under Part D. The shares of products with any UM applied, and each type of UM, are calculated as a share of products covered by plan type and year.

**Source:** Acumen LLC analysis of Part D formulary files for 2024 and 2025 and 2024 enrollment data for MedPAC.

# Part D's RxHCC risk-adjustment model adjusts payments to Part D plans

---

- Like the CMS-HCC model used in MA, the RxHCC model uses:
  - Demographic and diagnostic information to predict an enrollee's costs
  - Diagnoses grouped into condition categories (ranked into hierarchies)
  - Diagnoses from physician and inpatient & outpatient hospital records in MA encounter or FFS claims data
- Differences in diagnostic coding between FFS and MA
  - FFS: Little incentive to code diagnoses
  - MA: Financial incentive and infrastructure to code more diagnoses
- Substantial overlap (82%) of diagnoses in CMS-HCC and RxHCC models
  - Coding differences between MA and FFS translate to MA-PD and PDP differences

**Note:** RxHCC (prescription drug hierarchical condition category), CMS-HCC (CMS hierarchical condition category), MA (Medicare Advantage), FFS (fee-for-service). Plans take insurance risk for total capitated payments (direct subsidy plus enrollee premium). CMS risk adjustment accounts for the premium paid by enrollees. The CMS-HCC model is normalized across FFS beneficiaries.


# Estimating coding intensity in Part D

---

- We adapted MedPAC's DECI method of estimating coding intensity in MA for Part D plans by:
  - Addressing differences in the share of enrollees in Part D risk-model segments for LIS, non-LIS, and institutionalized beneficiaries
  - Estimating demographic risk scores using gross Part D-plan liability
  - Estimating coding intensity separately for MA-PDs and PDPs relative to the whole Part D population
- The RxHCC model is normalized across all Part D enrollees
  - Coding differences do not affect overall Part D spending but can generate different payments and premiums across plans for similar enrollees

**Note:** DECI (demographic estimate of coding intensity), MA (Medicare Advantage), LIS (low-income subsidy), MA-PD (Medicare Advantage Prescription Drug [plan]), PDP (prescription drug plan), RxHCC (prescription drug hierarchical condition category).

# Estimated coding intensity increased Part D risk scores for MA-PDs and decreased scores for PDPs, 2019-2023



**Note:** MA-PD (Medicare Advantage–prescription drug [plan]), PDP (stand-alone prescription drug plan). All estimates account for any differences in age, sex, low-income subsidy eligibility, and institutional status between MA-PD and PDP enrollees. New enrollees are constrained to have no coding intensity as their risk scores are not based on diagnostic coding.

**Source:** MedPAC analysis of CMS enrollment and risk-score files.

# What explains the difference in risk-standardized costs between MA-PDs and PDPs?

---

- Our findings suggest that MA-PDs did not achieve lower costs by applying more UM tools to the drugs used by their enrollees
- Differences in coding intensity do explain a portion of the recent differences in risk-standardized costs between MA-PDs and PDPs
- Persistence of large difference between MA-PDs and PDPs even after accounting for differences in coding intensity suggests other factor(s) are at play
- We will continue to monitor the risk-standardized costs and CMS's recent application of separate normalization factors for MA-PDs and PDPs

**Note:** MA-PD (Medicare Advantage Prescription Drug [plan]), PDP (prescription drug plan), UM (utilization management).

# Part D redesign and trends in the PDP market

---

- Part D-covered drugs are paid for through:
  - Cost sharing when beneficiaries fill prescriptions
  - Enrollee premiums and Medicare (taxpayers') subsidies
- Two key IRA changes increased the portion of spending that is risk adjusted:
  - Shifted spending from cost sharing to enrollee premiums and Medicare's capitated direct subsidy
  - Shifted Medicare's payments from cost-based reinsurance to capitated direct subsidy
- Increase in benefit costs and plans' insurance risk heightens the importance of Part D's risk adjustment

**Note:** IRA (Inflation Reduction Act of 2022).

# Part D redesign and trends in the PDP market— cont.

---

- For 2025, national average bid amount rose by nearly 180%<sup>†</sup>
- Large increases and variation in PDP bids led CMS to implement the Part D Premium Stabilization Demonstration
  - Even with the demonstration, enrollee premiums for individual PDPs varied widely
- Average enrollee premiums for MA-PDs decreased slightly, remained below that of PDPs
  - Ability to use MA rebates to lower Part D premiums and the opportunity to adjust their MA rebate allocation may have helped to keep premiums stable
  - Plans with higher risk scores relative to their costs will have lower risk-standardized bids and premiums

**Note:** PDP (prescription drug plan), MA-PD (Medicare Advantage Prescription Drug [plan]). The national average bid is the enrollment-weighted average of plan bids that reflect plans' expected benefit liability, net of postsale rebates and discounts and including required administrative costs and profit margin.

<sup>†</sup> Relative to the national average bid amount for 2024, which reflected plans' projected benefit costs for 2024. Some of the increase can be explained by higher-than-expected spending growth in 2023, thus preceding the planned implementation of the benefit redesign in 2025 (<https://www.cbo.gov/publication/60974>).

**Source:** CMS's annual release of Part D national average monthly bid amount and other Part C and Part D bid information.



# Discussion

- Questions
- Feedback or comments on material
- This material will be published as an informational chapter in our June 2025 report to the Congress



*Advising the Congress on Medicare issues*

# Medicare Payment Advisory Commission

 [www.medpac.gov](http://www.medpac.gov)

 [@medicarepayment](https://twitter.com/medicarepayment)